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Abstract
The article is based on a qualitative field study of how justice (in its wider sense) is
understood by practitioners and religious leaders from Judaism, IslamandChristianity,
who work with victims of domestic violence and abuse. The article focuses on two key
questions: a) howdo practitioners from the three faith communities conceptualise jus-
tice in relation to domestic violence and abuse (DVA)? b) how far do these practitioners
believe that victims of DVA have access to justice within their respective faith commu-
nities? The findings suggest that the concept of structural spiritual abuse should be
given more attention by the DVA literature and also by those who are working with
women of faith.
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1 Introduction
Domestic violence and abuse (DVA) has been reported to affect one in four
women in the UK (ONS 2016). It is defined by the Home Office (2013) as:
An incident or pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive or threaten-
ing behaviour, violence or abuse between those ages 16 or over who are or
have been intimate partners or family members regardless of gender or
sexuality. The abuse can encompass but is not limited to psychological,
physical, sexual, financial and emotional.
Following Skinner et al., (2005), we recognise that DVA may be understood
differently in different contexts. Of interest here is how DVA is perceived and
challenged within faith communities: specifically, we focus on the perceptions
of Muslim, Jewish and Catholic practitioners who come into contact with vic-
tims of DVA, including within the administration of religious tribunals, courts
and councils which preside over issues of marriage and divorce. Althoughmen
can also experience DVA (Hester et al 2017), and faith practitioners may deal
withmen as both perpetrators and victims, in this paperwe are concernedwith
DVA directed by men to women.
A notable omission from the Home Office definition of DVA, and of central
interest to this paper, is the concept of spiritual abuse. Spiritual abuse includes
telling an intimate partner that God hates them; refusing to let them worship
(e.g. not allowing partner to go to church); using faith as a weapon to control
and terrorise them for the abuser’s personal pleasure or gain; using religious
teaching to justify abuse (e.g. submit to your husband), or to compel forgive-
ness (CEDAR 2016, para. 1.7). In this article, we argue that spiritual abuse is not
only confined to partner abuse but can be said to characterise practices within
religious settings and members of the faith communities.
The qualitative study we draw on in this paper is part of a larger project
exploring how ‘justice’ (in its wider sense) is understood, sought, and experi-
enced by a wide range of victims,1 and other key stakeholders, of gender-based
1 We use the word ‘victim’ throughout this paper but recognise that individuals may identify
as victims and/or survivors of DVA, and at different times.
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violence. The project included interviews with victims of DVA who sought jus-
tice from various religious tribunals and with practitioners and religious lead-
ers who work with these women. This paper focuses on these practitioners’
conceptions of justice in response toDVA, andhow Islamic, Jewish andCatholic
religious tribunals may, or may not, offer ‘justice’ to victims. We place this
in the context of victims seeking authority for changes in religious status—
specifically the grantingof adivorce, or annulment, the continuedmembership
of the faith community and the ability to enter a further religious marriage.
2 Literature Review
King (1989, 32) observes that ‘women have always been deeply involved in reli-
gious beliefs and practices’ and all three of the monotheistic religions (Chris-
tianity, Islam and Judaism) assign a specific role to women, albeit not in posi-
tions of authority. However, in the less traditional forms of Islam, Judaism and
Christianity, this is now changing (Bano, Kalmbach 2012). For these faiths, the
family has sacred importance and women are seen as central in maintaining
family values and the intergenerational transmission of faith (Gillum et al.
2006; Guthertz 2004; Raday 2012; Nason-Clark 2000; Macey 1999).
For deeply observantwomen across faiths, spirituality is part of everyday life
(Gillum, Sullivan, et al. 2006; Cares, Cusick 2012; Bano 2012). Faith and spiritu-
ality have been shown to provide a source of strength and comfort to women,
especially where they are subject to DVA (Gillum, Sullivan et al. 2006; Pyles
2007; Raday 2012). It can, therefore, be all the more damaging when abuse
impacts on the spiritual aspects of their lives: for instance by abusers’ insis-
tence on obsessive observance or by being forced to transgress religious tenets
(Starr 2017; Cares and Cusick 2012; Dehan and Levi 2009; Oakley and Kinmond
2013; Dehan and Levi 2009; Sanderson 2008).
The existing literature on the experience of DVA victims seeking support
from their faith community and/or religious tribunals to divorce indicates that
for Catholic, Muslim or Jewish women, the priest, imam or rabbi may be the
first point of contact when they experience what they may perceive as ‘per-
sonal’ or ‘family’ issues such as DVA (Bent-Bent-Goodley, Noelle, et al. 2012;
Gillum, Sullivan, et al. 2006; Nason-Clark 2004). Research by Choi (2015) sug-
gests that Black and minority ethnic women in particular may seek support
from religious leaders, evidencing an intersection of immigration status, eth-
nicity and religious beliefs around the sanctity of marriage and the home,
which can make women reluctant to report to ‘outside authorities’ such as the
police.
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Given the potential role of religious leaders as gatekeepers to seeking sup-
port and/or justice for DVA, understanding what advice women from all back-
grounds are given is important (Dyer 2010; Guthartz 2004; Cooper-White 2011).
Levitt and Ware (2006) interviewed religious leaders from Jewish, Christian,
and Islamic faiths about DVA and divorce, finding that while greater responsi-
bility was attributed to the perpetrator, many considered divorce a ‘last resort’
and encouraged victims to consider forgiveness and reconciliation, if possible.
Other studies suggest that clergy may be reluctant to refer women to secular
services in case they receive advice which is inconsistent with religious teach-
ing; promoting instead religious arbitration or interpersonal mediation by the
faith leader (Nason-Clark 2010; Rotunda et al. 2004; and see Southall Black
Sisters 2016). The patriarchal positioning of women as ‘responsible for the col-
lective identity and passing on the [faith community’s] particular traditions
and norms’ (Ahmed and Norton 2010: 20) would appear to be implicated in
these responses.
There is minimal UK academic research focused on religious tribunals,
despite media interest in recent years. The Archbishop of Canterbury’s lec-
ture on Religious and Civil Law in 2008 led to research by Douglas and col-
leagues (2012) into the status of religious tribunals as ‘complementary’ (operat-
ing alongside) or ‘supplementary’ (operating in addition to) to the British court
system. More broadly, and against a wider background of hostility and suspi-
cious towards Islam, there has been public disquiet about the role of Sharia
councils, including an abortive attempt to curb religious quasi-jurisdiction
within the Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill 2014–2015.
However, this emerging literature on religious and state law and practice has
little to say on the response of tribunals to DVA. In this paperwe add to the liter-
ature by exploring how religious practitioners conceive of ‘justice’ in response
to DVA and to what extent Islamic, Jewish and Catholic religious tribunals may
offer ‘justice’ to victims of domestic abuse within marriage.
2.1 Sharia Councils and DVA
The understanding of Sharia ideology is not uniform across Muslim commu-
nities and has been interpreted differently by scholars. There is ample litera-
ture that suggests DVA is not tolerated within Islam (Rashid 2016, Mir-hosseini
2013; Anvar 2013; Mernissi 1991) and that Islamic teachings which discriminate
against women might be reinterpreted in the light of modern understand-
ings and culture (Bowen 2010; Mashhour 2005; Anwar 2013). For example,
Muslim feminists such as Mir-Hosseini (2010) insists the notion of justice to
argue against polygamy and men’s right to talaq (divorce). She insists that ‘…
they are juristic constructions that no longer reflect contemporary notions of
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justice’.2 Shukri and Labriz (1992) also challenge the practice of polygamy and
believe no man apart from the Prophet is capable of being just towards many
wives. Fazaeli (2007: 6) recommendsusing ‘dynamic [ijtihad] asmeans of inter-
preting Islamic texts to satisfy the needs of our time’. However, Mojab (2001)
believes that arguments put forward by various Islamic feminists and by mod-
erate clerics, utilising the notion of ijtihad (Arabic, translated to English: inde-
pendent reasoning) to unmask the discriminatory laws in a somewhat vigilante
manner, do not challenge the religious roots of these laws. She stresses that,
while patriarchy ismore than religion, it would not be possible to ‘degenderize’
Islam without shaking its foundations.
Many Muslim couples in the UK have nikah-only (Islamic marriage) mar-
riages (Bano 2004, 2012; Sadar 2013). This means that in the event of a relation-
ship breakdown the British Courts cannot issue a divorce, and even if a woman
has obtained a civil divorce, she may consider herself still married (or be con-
sidered so by family/community) until a religious divorce has been obtained
(Bano 2012). Under Sharia law, divorce can be actualised for a number of rea-
sons, though it is generally agreed it is a much easier process for a male to
undergo—using theproclamationof talaqover a three-monthperiod (thismay
vary according to custom) (Carroll 1997). If aman refuses to grant hiswife talaq,
a womanmay be granted a khula divorce in which she gives something for her
freedom,usually the returnof amahr (dowry) (Bowen2010) or through thepro-
cess of judicial intervention, such as requesting divorce from a Sharia council.
It is generally agreed that grounds for this type of divorce could include DVA
(Reiss 2009).
Within the UK context, Sharia councils position themselves as advisory bod-
ies concerning matrimonial issues, such as divorce. There is no one type of
Sharia lawemployedby Sharia councils and arbitration courts and Sharia coun-
cils could be heavily influenced by the geographical origins of their members
(Sadar 2013; Mashhour 2005; Johnson and Aly Sergie 2014). This can be a cause
for concernwhere cultural differences are being presented as Islamic and influ-
encing procedure/rulings. A number of studies have indicated that imamshave
been known to advise victims of DVA to staywith or to reconcilewith the perpe-
trators (Bano 2004; Bano 2008; Griffiths 2014). Some testimonials (see Southall
Black Sisters, 2016; Cox 2015) have revealed that a number of women have been
asked to have a joint meeting with their perpetrators; several indicated that
2 This is an extract from an interview conducted with Ziba Mir-Hosseini by Yoginder Sikand
on 7th February 2010. For the full script refer to: http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2010/
sikand090210.html.
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their experiences of abuse had not been taken seriously by the imams and
that their cases had been unnecessarily prolonged. Lepore (2012) indicates the
importance of a religious ruling for Muslim women, but argues that in unreg-
ulated Sharia councils, rulings are often discriminatory against women. Bano
(2008) notes that while some women found reconciliation space useful, there
were examples in which some councils were giving more credence to a man’s
testimony and were ‘women blaming’.
2.2 Jewish Religious Courts and DVA
Many Jewish community leaders and scholars have condemned DVA over the
years (Mirvis 2017; Twerski 20153). Yet women and practitioners reported that,
although some rabbis were seen as being proactive and helpful, others pre-
ferred to totally ignore what was happening. Indeed, a survey carried out
for Jewish Women’s Aid (Abramson & Peterson 2011) found 62% of respon-
dents did not recall hearing a rabbi publicly condemning DVA. However, in a
major new initiative, marking the 2017 International Day to EliminateViolence
againstWomen, the Board of Deputies (the elected representatives of the Jew-
ish Community in Britain) joined forces with Jewish Women’s Aid to mount a
campaign to condemn domestic violence including a request to all rabbis to
preach against abuse on the 25th November 2017.
As Levitt & Ware (2016:1187) point out, ‘by structuring differences in power
as a religious duty, womenmay be left vulnerable to abuse as they believe they
are unable to end their marriages if they wished to maintain their faith’. For
some Jewish women, therefore, their spiritual and cultural traditions can exert
intense pressure on them not to disclose abuse even within the family, or to
end their marriages.
For those who do choose to leave a relationship, a religious divorce (a get,
plural gittim) is crucially important in enabling them to move on with their
lives, remarrywithin their faith, if theywish to do so, and retain their links with
their religious community. Similar findings come from Rush (2010) Starr (2017)
andHorsbugh (1995).Gittim are sanctifiedby a religious court, or BethDin,with
each of the main branches of Judaism having its own Beth Din and a plurality
of interpretation of Jewish religious law or halaka.4 A divorce is bymutual con-
3 It is significant that when Rabbi Twerski’s book was first published in 1996, the overwhelm-
ingly negative reaction was such that he was forced to ask for police protection for his
public appearances. No such furore occurred after the second edition appeared 19 years
later.
4 Battei Din deal with all aspects of Jewish law, including ritual and practice, mediation and
arbitration.
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sent and both parties must agree to the marriage ending. If the man does not
agree, the woman is not free to remarry and becomes an agunah or chained
wife. This ruling is strictly adhered to in Orthodox practice, although various
types of pressure can be brought to bear on theman to agree (Greenaway 2017)
including use of The Divorce (Religious Marriages Act) 2002 which provides
that a civil court can defer the issue of the Decree Absolute until a get has been
consented to. However, if the husband has no particular need for the Decree
Absolute, this is of no effect, although it is not known how often this provision
has been used. According to the Reform Beth Din in the UK, if a woman has
obtained a civil divorce, then she is entitled to a get and will point out to the
husband that it is his religious duty to agree to one. If he does not present his
case, after being formally contacted, the Reform Beth Din will issue a get on
his behalf. However, divorces granted under this process are not acceptable to
an Orthodox Beth Din and this dichotomy of approach would be a barrier to
remarriage in an Orthodox synagogue in the UK or elsewhere.
The Board of Deputies’ statistics for 2010 (Vulkan 2012) gives the overall
number of religious divorces as 221. They comment that this represents a con-
tinuing downward trend and this may represent an increasing number of cou-
ples opting for a civil divorce only.
2.3 CatholicMatrimonial Tribunals and DVA
In the Catholic Church, marriage is considered an indissoluble sacramental
bond: ‘What God has joined together, let no one put apart’ (Matthew 19:6).
A religious divorce is therefore not conceivable. Catholics may obtain a civil
divorce andmay continue to participate inHoly Communion;5 however, if they
enter a new sexual relationship, this is considered to be in violation of themar-
riage bond and would preclude individuals from receiving Communion.
Matrimonial tribunals are presided over by priests and canon lawyers6 and
operate in each diocese7 in England andWales (and indeed around the world).
The tribunal is not a divorce court or a marriage counselling service: rather, it
exists to consider the ‘facts’ of amarriage and assesswhether or not the bond of
marriage was established.Where there are grounds for asserting that the bond
5 The Sacrament of the Eucharist or ‘Holy Communion’ as a rite is of central importance to
Catholic faith practice.
6 Canon law is the system of laws and legal principles made and enforced by the universal
Catholic Church and interpreted by ‘canonists’ or ‘canon lawyers’. It is not civilly binding in
England andWales.
7 The Catholic Church is administrated through ‘dioceses’ which are defined territorial areas
presided over by a Bishop.
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was not validly formed, the marriage can be annulled. This allows both indi-
viduals to re-marry within the Catholic faith. In other words, an ‘annulment’
is not breaking the bond of marriage, rather it recognises the bond was not
formed at the start. Grounds for consideration include capacity, consent and a
sincerity of purpose (see Canon 1095). For example, there may be grounds for
annulment where there is evidence that the person suffers ‘from a grave lack
of discretionary judgement concerning the essential matrimonial rights and
obligations to be mutually given and accepted’ (Canon 1095.1.2). In the 2015
Apostolic Letter Mitis Iudex Dominus Iesus (‘The Lord Jesus, Clement Judge’),
Pope Francis simplified the process for applying for a declaration of nullity:
the grounds however remain the same.
The universal Catholic Church condemns DVA (see United States Confer-
ence of Catholic Bishops 2002; CEDAR undated). In his 2016 Apostolic Exhorta-
tion, The Joy of Love (Amoris Laetitia), Pope Francis identifies violence against
womenas ‘craven acts of cowardice […] rather than a showof masculinepower’
(Holy See, 2016, para 54). Francis recalls Church Canon Law 1153, saying that in
cases where a spouse and children are experiencing DVA, ‘separation becomes
inevitable’ and even ‘morally necessary’ for their safety. He expresses empathy
for individuals ‘who have been forced bymaltreatment from a husband or wife
to interrupt their live together.’
Yet while Canon Law 1153 clarifies that the domestic abuse victim is not at
fault in leaving the marriage, it goes on: ‘In all cases, when the cause for the
separation ceases, conjugal livingmust be restoredunless ecclesiastical author-
ity has established otherwise’.8 This single piece of Canon Law captures well
the tension within Catholic teaching: it condemns abuse and recognises that
the perpetrator and not the victim has violated the sacramentality of the mar-
riage. Yet it does not provide victims with the means of re-marrying within the
Church on the grounds of abuse alone: indeed, it asks victims to hold the door
open, potentially indefinitely, to the perpetrator changing their behaviour.
As the discussion below will demonstrate, the need to find grounds for nul-
lity at the inception of themarriage, has profound implications forwomenwho
begin to experience DVA aftermarriage.
8 Code of Canon Law (LibreriaEditriceVaticana). Available at: http://www.vatican.va/archive/
ENG1104/_P45.HTM.
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3 Methods
This paper draws on data from a wider study on Justice, Inequality and GBV
funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (2015–2018), which
included analysis of police and women’s support service data, and interviews
with 251 victims of GBV and 40 practitioners. The wider study looked at how
inequalities and social identities intersect with the experience of ‘justice’. This
paper uses data from 15 of the 40 practitioner interviews, where it was possi-
ble to explore DVA in the context of three faith identities: Muslim, Jewish and
Roman Catholic. As outlined above, these three faith communities are notable
in their provision of formalisedmechanisms for arbitrating issues aroundmar-
riage, separation and—explicitly or implicitly—DVA.
All interviewees were accessed through purposive sampling. The authors
made direct contact with the interviewees by email, enclosing information
about the project and requesting their participation. Interviewees signed a
consent formwhich included indicating their agreement to recording the inter-
views (apart fromone), whichwere subsequently transcribed and anonymised.
Interviews were semi-structured, conducted either face-to-face or by phone,
and lasted onehour on average. Someof the principle topics thatwere included
in the interview schedule were: the participants’ understandings of DVA (they
were not provided with a definition); justice within the context of DVA; why
womenchoose touseunofficial communitymechanisms (Sharia councils, Beth
Din, local church) to seek justice; the advantages and disadvantages of using
these mechanisms and how they deal with DVA cases. The anonymised tran-
scripts were coded thematically by the authors using the header codes ‘def-
initions of justice’ and ‘access to justice’ and tested through peer debriefing
(Lincoln and Guba 1985). Ethical approval was granted by a University of Bris-
tol Research Ethics Committee. One of the limitations of the study is the small
numberof participants in the JewishandCatholic groups.This is partly because
the original funded proposal only included a nested study on Islam and Sharia.
However, as the research developed, we believed it was important to widen the
scope of the project and include people with experience of Beth Din and the
Catholic church. This decisionwas taken in the last stages before the end of the
project and hence emerging late in the overall project, we faced the difficulties
in gaining access. However, the stark similarities across the faiths, we believe
justifies the inclusion of this smaller set of data to illustrate wider points about
justice and ‘faith’ responses.
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table 1 Interviewees by faith and role (n= 15)
Practitioners working withMuslim faith community (n = 8)
Interviewee 1(female) Religious Scholar in Sharia Council
Interviewee 2 (male) Panellist in Sharia Council
Interviewee 3 (female) Panellist in Sharia Council
Interviewee 4 (female) Panellist in Sharia Council
Interviewee 5 (male) Marriage Counsellor in Sharia Council
Interviewee 7 (female) Working for a women’s organisation
Interviewee 8 (female) Working for a woman’s organisation
Practitioners working with Jewish faith community (n = 2)
Interviewee 9 (female) JewishWomen’s Aid support worker
Interviewee 10 (female) JewishWomen’s Aid support worker
Practitioners working with Roman Catholic faith community (n = 5)
Interviewee 11 (male) A Roman Catholic priest and canon lawyer who
presides over a Catholic Matrimonial Tribunal
Interviewee 12 (female) A facilitator of an NGO-hosted online forum for
Christian women (mainly US/UK, all Christian
denominations) who are experiencing (or have
experienced) domestic abuse
Interviewee 13 (male) A safeguarding co-ordinator for a Catholic diocese
Interviewee 14 (female) A safeguarding officer for a Catholic diocese
Interviewee 15 (male) The chair of a safeguarding commission for a
Catholic diocese
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4 Findings
4.1 HowDo Practitioners within Faith Communities Conceptualise
Justice in relation to DVA?
In this first section, we consider how practitioners working with Muslim, Jew-
ish and Catholic communities conceptualise ‘justice’ in relation to domestic
violence and abuse.
4.1.1 Muslim
Conceptualisationof justice regardingDVAbyparticipantswas varied andcom-
plex. Two of the participants (Interviewee 7 & 8) who worked in women’s
organisations and believed in the abolition of the Sharia councils, stressed that
justice means adhering to the principles of universal human rights. Although,
Interviewee 7 stated that she understands that for some women of faith, the
existence of Sharia councils could be important. For the rest of the participants
who worked in various capacities in the Sharia councils, their sources of inspi-
ration were Koran and Sunnah, and they directly referred to religious texts:
We go to the Koran and the authentic Sunnah, and that tells you what
justice is ….
Interviewee 5
Two interviewees referred to the concept of ‘day of judgment’ for those who
have not been granted justice in this world. One interviewee associated justice
with secular legal protection; for others, it was a combination of both, but all
agreed that women should be able to live their lives free from abuse. The con-
cepts of fairness, acknowledgement of abuse, not being blamed for it and being
able to live in peace were repeatedly used by the participants.
Interviewees 7 and 8 who worked in women’s organisations believed that
injustice is a violation of women’s autonomy and being forced, implicitly or
explicitly, to obtain an Islamic divorce is a gross injustice. Interviewee 8 stres-
sed:
… It must be the same for rich and poor and for both the sexes and differ-
ent races, different religions. So, there is an equality before the law… I do
associate justice with the legal concept.
Interviewee 8
However, others believed that justice is not granted to women of faith if they
are not given access to a religious-based organisation to obtain their divorce.
12 aghtaie et al.
10.1163/18785417-20200001 | Religion and Gender (2020) 1–27
For seven of the eight interviewees, justice was perceived as central to the
Islamic way of life. In other words, for them, God’s law was viewed as insepara-
ble from justice. The majority believed that sometimes the religious scholars’
understanding of the sacred text is tainted by culture and hence called for an
‘authentic’ interpretation of the religious text. For example, one interviewee
stressed that the word ‘beating’ in Verse 4 in Al Nesa9 is symbolic and should
not be taken out of context.
One interviewee emphasised that within the Islamic jurisprudence women
are not inferior to men and inflicting any form of violence is injustice and sub-
ject to punishment. Another commented on the role of the organisations in
focusing on men and stated: ‘We are letting men down, we are not educating
them’ (Interviewee 7).
Although all eight participants claimed that justice should not be gendered
and that it is about putting bothparties, especially the victims, on anequal foot-
ing, those whoworked in some capacity in Sharia councils did not see the right
of men to polygamous marriages as a form of emotional violence and hence
injustice. Some stressed that polygamy is a divinely sanctioned practice with
the condition that the husbandmaintains justice among all hiswives and treats
themwith equality. They expressed the view that the first wife does not have to
stay in themarriage if she does not wish to do so and can petition for a divorce.
One interviewee called polygamy a ‘lifestyle choice’. In contrast, Interviewees
7 & 8 perceived polygamy as a form emotional violence and injustice.
Hence, it seems when one’s understanding of the sacred text does not trans-
late into a unified definition of justice, then it is likely that DVA can be justified
as a divine rightwhich could result in spiritual abuse. The impact of such abuse
can be elevated when those in power misuse their religious authority.
4.1.2 Jewish
The practitioners we interviewedwereworkingwithwomen from all themajor
branches of Judaism. They felt that justice, for Jewish women of faith, was
a multi-layered and complex concept, moving from aspects of everyday life
within the family and the faith community, to the deepest needs of faith and
9 Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has made one of them to
excel the other, and because they spend (to support them) from their means. Therefore, the righ-
teouswomen are devoutly obedient (to Allah and to their husbands), and guard in the husband’s
absence what Allah orders them to guard (e.g. their chastity, their husband’s property, etc.). As
to those women on whose part you see ill-conduct, admonish them ( first), (next), refuse to share
their beds, (and last) beat them (lightly, if it is useful), but if they return to obedience, seek not
against themmeans (of annoyance). Surely, Allah is EverMost High, Most Great (Quran, 4: 34).
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spirituality. As a basic requirement, practitioners felt that women who had
experiencedDVAwould see justice as being treatedwith fairness and respect, as
being able to live in peace in their community, free from fear and harassment,
rather than living in a destructive relationship. They would look to achieve
justice from the secular society in terms of a civil divorce, a fair financial settle-
ment and equitable arrangements for the children of themarriage. At a deeper
level, justice would be the ability to be accepted by and play a full part in the
faith community; being able to live in accordance with the culture and tradi-
tions of Judaism and practice their faith in association with others. A further
and crucial element of justice at this level would be the granting of a religious
divorce, marking the end of their previous relationship and freeing them to
move on with their lives with the blessing of their religion.
However, for women living within the Strictly Orthodox community, justice
might be considered in a very differentway, as a totally spiritual concept. In this
interpretation, according to the practitioners, justice comes only from G-d10
and is based on a life of faith and spirituality which permeates every aspect of
their existence. For them, justice would not be seen as political and achievable
undermortal jurisdiction. Rather, justicewouldbe seen as spiritually based and
coming from a divine source.
Asked what, in their view, justice might look like, practitioners spoke of the
need for changes in the civil justice system and for a proactive approach to the
granting of a get. And for women, ‘to be able to feel that, as a human being,
they have every right to live in a way that feels good and feels right for them,
free of pain and everything that goes with domestic violence and free of suffer-
ing in that way’ (Interviewee 9). It was considered, however, that a lot needed
to change before that could take place.
4.1.3 Catholic
Three of the five interviewees spoke directly to defining ‘justice’ in relation
to domestic violence. First, practitioners articulated ‘justice’ in relation to the
teachings of the Catholic Church. Second, practitioners talked of how the
Church community and parish priest can hold the perpetrator to account as
well as support the victim to continue topractice their faith in good conscience.
Turning first to Church teaching, three themes were identified. First, two
interviewees talked of challenging the view that the Bible supports ‘wife abuse’
or staying in an abusive marriage. One interviewee claimed that such state-
ments were:
10 In Jewish tradition, the name of the Supreme Being is never written in full.
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… borne out of ignorance, because scripture was written in a time and
place. Okay, it’s inspired by God, but the people were still subject to the
culture of their day and the standards of their day. We’ve moved on.
Interviewee 11
In a similar vein, another interviewee described reassuringwomen that leaving
an abusive relationship is supported by scripture:
… there are lots and lots of passages in the Bible that show that God
requires justice first, before mercy.
Interviewee 12
Second, Interviewee 11 talked of domestic abuse as a violation of trust, under-
mining the “connectedness” of all life on earth that Pope Francis refers to in
Laudato Si’ (2015) as well as a personal “injustice against their human dignity”.
Interviewee 12 recounted the sense of spiritual bewilderment felt by victims
when their husbands andperpetratorswere alsoChristians. In this understand-
ing, justice requires the Church to:
… bring the injustice to light, and validate their [the victim’s] experience,
but also restore their dignity under God.
Interviewee 12
Third, it was notable that all five practitioners raised the issue of forgiveness;
three in relation to domestic abuse. All argued that forgiveness was a ‘separate
discussion’ in the sense that it should not detract from seeking justice for the
victim.Additionally, forgivenesswas conceivedaspossible only if ledby the vic-
tim, and once their wellbeing was secured. Interviewee 13 for example spoke of
a situation where clergy might seek to talk about “redemption”:
Iwill try and say, ‘Absolutely, if someonewants todoX,YorZ [i.e. if a priest
wants to pray with the victim or intervene personally on their behalf],
however, it’s got to be safe to do that’.
Interviewee 13
I don’t think forgiveness is part of safeguarding.
Interviewee 14
Aswell as formal recognition by the Church andChurch teaching of their expe-
rience as victims of abuse, practitioners also talked about the importance of
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affirmation from their parish priest and Church community. First, practition-
ers felt that victims wanted to be believed by their Church community and for
the community to locate fault squarely with the perpetrator.
Sometimes, they want to feel that they’ve been exonerated, that, ‘I have
been abused’, and themarriage has gonedownhill andbrokenup… [they]
want to feel that, ‘this person [who] has put me through so much, that it
wasn’t my fault’.
Interviewee 12
Interviewee 12 felt there could sometimes be a reluctance within Christian
communities to acknowledge the ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing’, particularly if that
individual had an active role in the Church orwas held in esteem. Justice there-
fore required belief by the community, even when belief was difficult.
Second, two interviewees identified the critical role of the parish priest in
responding to domestic violence. Both talked of ignorance of domestic abuse
as tantamount to complicity—a form of structural violence:
So when a priest is confronted with a situation like that, he’s obliged—If
he doesn’t engagewith the personwho is coming to himand seeking help,
then he is actually part of the injustice. He’s perpetuating that injustice by
allowing it to happen.
Interviewee 11
This risk was attributed to some clergy having “black and white” thinking: a
phrase repeated by different interviewees and attributed by one participant to
the training to the priesthood, at least historically. Two interviewees conjured
images of the stern priest turning away the victim of abuse at the church door:
‘I’ve told you what’s what. Done and dusted. Don’t darken my doorstep
again.’ There are, sadly, some priests who behave in that sort of heavy-
handed way, and they don’t have the blessing of the church when they
treat people like that.
Interviewee 11
Justice is not even on the mindset of [such] vicars and ministers. They
can’t even provide charity to these women.
Interviewee 12
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4.2 How Far Do Practitioners Believe That Victims of DVA Have Access to
Justice within Their Respective Faith Communities?
For womenwho experience DVA, faith and the faith community have been var-
iously described as either a road block or a resource (Greater London Domes-
tic Violence Project 2008), support or a barrier (Pyles 2007). As Gillum et al
(2006) have pointed out, a supportive community and proactive faith leaders
can enable a woman to rebuild her life and gain strength and comfort from her
faith. Alternatively, silence, or a negative response, can block her attempts to
obtain justice.We asked practitioners if they felt that victims of DVA had access
to justice within their faith communities.
4.2.1 Muslim
All but one of the interviewees believed that for someMuslimwomen, a way of
life, family and religion are very closely intertwined, so it is a necessity for those
experiencing DVA to have access to some form of religious mechanism to seek
mediation or obtain a divorce. They stressed that mainstream services are not
an appropriate route for these women for a variety of reasons; they are not cul-
turally sensitive and do not have a comprehensive understanding of the family
dynamic within the faith communities, such as the impact of a partner’s lack
of adherence to religious mandates. In addition, Sharia councils’ services are
cheap.Most importantly, it was argued by all those working in the Sharia coun-
cils that the councils provide the necessary service for women to leave abusive
relationships:
… the women would often say that for people of my community isn’t
accepting [sic], my husband doesn’t accept it … I would like an Islamic
divorce, I need to have a certificate that piece of paper so there is that
closure.
Interviewee 2
However, the above viewwas disputed by another interviewee, who stated that
Sharia councils and fundamentalist groups have created a coercive atmosphere
inwhichwomen feel that they cannot leave abusive relationships andmove on
without being given an Islamic divorce.
The religious scholar held the view that religious mechanisms are of vital
importance for the ‘spiritual health’ of the Muslim community and, most
importantly, allow women to free themselves from abuse by granting women
religious divorces or providing a culturally sensitive mediation if the couple
wishes to stay together.
Six of the interviewees stressed that they do not coerce women to stay in
an abusive relationship for the sake of children, family or community and they
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would encouragewomen to call the police if there is concern about their safety.
They also pointed out that if there is a court order, they never recommend
reconciliation. However, the majority acknowledged that there is lack of con-
sistency among the Sharia councils across the UK and some are dominated by
religious scholars who adhere to a ‘traditional’ interpretation of Islam, so that
they may not grant a divorce to women on the basis of emotional abuse and
being in an unhappymarriage. Male guardianship was given importance if the
husband was a true believer:
If the husband obeys Allah, then if the wife obeys the husband, it means
she is obeying God.
Interviewee 5
Interviewees 7 and 8 who worked in women’s organisations positioned the
councils as inherently patriarchal, wheremen are deemed the point of author-
ity because of women’s alleged innate emotionality and deficiency of rational
judgment. One of them echoed the view that:
There is a distinction between the idea of faith and wanting to live by
religious laws … women of faith are telling us that they would like to be
judged by God and not by the Mullahs.
Interviewee 8
She stressed the Sharia councils’ practice is contrary to the law of the land.
The commonexampleswere the acceptance of polygamous andunderagemar-
riages. It was emphasised that allowing them to operate undermines the gov-
ernment’s policy on acknowledging the concept of coercive control as a form
of DVA. This is because it was claimed that councils pressure women to stay in
unhappy and abusive marriages by using religion as a tool:
Creating this impression that civil divorce is not valid … it’s individual
coercion in some cases, and absolutely structural coercion, to the extent
that they feel that they’re not divorced.
Interviewee 8
4.2.2 Jewish
Within the Jewish community, practitioners felt that women who were expe-
riencing DVA, had to consider carefully their options and what this could
mean in terms of justice for themselves and for their children. In a close-knit
community, revealing abuse could be seen as bringing shame on the commu-
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nity and stigmatising the family. This might lead to their being discriminated
against within the community, with negative and disparaging comments being
made about them by ex-partners and others, or to feelings of isolation and
loss of identity. A major concern would also be the needs of their children
within the religious community, with possible damage to their futuremarriage
prospects, since prospective partners and their families might not wish to be
associated with a family where there had been domestic violence. All of these
concerns were also voiced by the women we interviewed and have also been
noted by researchers in this field (Ringel & Bina 2007; Guthartz 2004; Rush
2010; Horsburgh 1995). As a result, women could feel held in a web of con-
straints and feel that they had no choice but to stay in the relationships (Starr
2017).
Seeking support for themselves and their families could present further
dilemmas for these women. Practitioners pointed out that there was often
an extreme reluctance to involve outside and secular agencies that would be
unlikely to understand their culture and background or to respect their reli-
gious beliefs. Informal and community mechanisms varied in their degree of
helpfulness, with some being very helpful, proactive and, as Cares and Cusick
(2006) suggest, providing a source of strength and confidence, with others
ignoring the problem. The women we interviewed who had suffered DVA felt
that turning to a faith based organisation was the best option for them and
that Jewish Women’s Aid was seen as a trusted source of support and advice
and practitioners believed for those women who felt that their spiritual beliefs
were incompatible with ending the marriage, they provided a safe space for
them to understand what was happening and make informed choices.
As discussed earlier, practitioners stressed that, for women of faith, their
spiritual values meant that the obtaining a religious divorce or get was of
paramount importance. It was described as giving them a sense of religious
justice, respect and status within the community, enabling them to move on
with their lives and remarry within their faith if they wished to do so. To refuse
a get or to seek tomanipulate the situation by offering aReform get (not accept-
able to Orthodox Judaism) or demanding extortionate financial settlements
have been reported by Rush (2010) and Starr (2017) and were mentioned by
women who were interviewed. These actions can be seen as further evidence
of continuing emotional abuse, as Cobin (1986) suggests, as well as a denial of
justice. Indeed, Oakley and Kinmond (2013), Starr (2017) and Cares and Cusick
(2012) have gone further and argued that this denial strikes at the very roots
of belief and can be seen as spiritual abuse. From a secular point of view,
Raday (2012) has pointed out that this lack of justice is also a denial of human
rights.
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4.2.3 Catholic
Proving nullity of marriage for factors present at the time, such as ‘deliberate
deceit’ (Canon 1098) immediately raises the question in the context of DVA
what if the abuse only surfaced later in the marriage?
Just as parishpriestsmay interpretChurchdoctrine and scripturedifferently,
it is likely that Canon lawyers (who are also priests) will interpret Canon law in
the light of their own principles albeit delimited by the requirements of their
office. The Canon lawyer interviewed here was clear that he would “do what-
ever I can” to resolve the situation of individual petitioners “so long aswhatever
I do is just and honest, and with integrity”. He felt the tribunal needed to:
… exhaust all avenues of proof and questioning on the nature of what it
is that’s happened. And can we be totally sure that what has happened is
a blip in the relationship years down the line, or is it something that was
present at the beginning?
Interviewee 11
This might involve calling family, friends and experts to give their evidence on
the relationship. Yet, such grounds could not always be found, which the inter-
viewee acknowledged was a situation he struggled with. He also reflected that
“canon law can’t answer every question”.
Individuals who have gone through a civil divorce but have not had their
marriage annulled can continue to receive Holy Communion. However, if they
enter into a new relationship, this is considered by the Church as adultery as
the marriage bond still stands. It is this specific issue that has historically pre-
cluded many divorced Catholics, including those who were victims of DVA,
from accessing the sacraments. Pope Francis, in the 2016 document Amoris
Laetitia (The Joy of Love), suggest the situations of the divorced and the remar-
ried should be carefully discerned by priests on case-by-case basis. Interviewer
11 reflected that sentiment:
Pope Francis is very much of that mind, that not every problem can be
solved in a canon law way, and that the church has to be more dynamic
than limiting itself to those very narrow confines. Because God is dynam-
ic, and therefore, we have to be more dynamic.
Interviewer 11
For the safeguarding practitioners (Interviewees, 13, 14 and 15), access to justice
was first and foremost about safety and an assessment of the need for statu-
tory reporting. These interviewees acknowledged that they worked in a faith
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environment, but their approach was to gather intelligence and follow clear
referral protocols, particularly around child protection. Interestingly, this did
mean that where cases of DVA did not include a child or a vulnerable adult, the
Catholic safeguarding teamhad an advice and training role for priests, but their
influence was more discretionary. Formal safeguarding mechanisms such as
‘Covenants of Care’,11 where a domestic violence perpetrator for example could
be asked to attend a different mass time from the victim, were also mentioned
as examples of practical and discreet justice offered by the Church.
Finally, Interviewee 12 talked about the potential for the Church to provide
social justice to victims where the criminal justice system and family courts
mayhave let themdown.This of course relies on theChurch continuing to chal-
lenge ‘black-and-white’ thinking at the pastoral level and requires continued
Vatican leadership on issues of DVA. Asked whether DVA may become grounds
for annulment in the future, Interviewer 11 was cautious but noted the reform-
ing instincts of the current Pope:
Pope Francis is challenging us to look at new ways of seeing this. I think
that, possibly, in time, that could change.
Interviewee 11
In summary, it is suggested that there may be incremental changes to the pas-
toral, if not the doctrinal, Catholic response to the issue of domestic abuse
within marriage.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
There were some key similarities between the narratives of the three faith
groups but also a few differences. What needs to be noted is that the partici-
pants in the Muslim faith groups had particularly contested views concerning
the concept of justice and access to justice in comparison to the other groups.
This could be partly due to the fact that theMuslim sample was larger than the
other two groups and it included people who are working in the Sharia coun-
cils as well as those who work in women’s organisations and one that strongly
favoured the abolishment of Sharia councils in the UK. Additionally, it is impor-
tant to bear inmind that the samples in all three groups are not representative.
11 These are agreements drawn up between the Church and an individual who is consid-
ered to represent a possible risk. Covenants concerning known offenders will often be
co-drafted with Police and Probation.
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For most of the participants in all the three groups, sources of inspiration
for Justice were God, and the sacred texts and their understanding of justice
was influenced by their faith. They believed that, for women of faith, religion
is a way of life and hence the mainstream services are not equipped to address
their needs. Some referred to divine sources to substantiate the view that their
respective faith does not condone DVA and that justice is about being able to
live free from abuse. However, the understanding of what constitutes an abu-
sive behaviour was contested among the practitioners from the Muslim faith
group. For example, not everyone accepted polygamy as a divine right and one
perceived it as a form of emotional abuse.
Apart from interviewee 8, who was in favour of the abolishment of Sharia
councils and believed Islamic fundamentalists are the main orchestrators of
these faith organisations, it was commonly agreed among the rest of the par-
ticipants from the three faith groups that access to religious justice was of
paramount importance. As one of theMuslim scholars put it, their existence is
of vital importance for the ‘spiritual health’ of the community. They believed
that access to religious justice is possible, if the divine sources are interpreted
in the light of the modern era and not be tainted by one’s personal view or the
cultural and political contexts. Bearing in mind that using religion to justify
abuse is a form of spiritual abuse (Dehan and Levi 2009), we can conceptu-
alise the narratives of the participants in regards to the process of access to
justice under the umbrella of what we call ‘structural spiritual abuse’. This is
when there is a gap between rhetoric and reality of access to religious justice
due to adherence to conservative interpretation of the sacred text by the faith
organisations and/or communities.
According to all participants except Interviewees 7 & 8, religious justice was
closely linked to being able to obtain a religious divorce or annulment of the
marriage within the context of DVA. Considering that all three faith groups
believed that DVA is not condoned by their respective faiths, misusing reli-
gious texts by some of the faith organisations, as well as the communities,
to coerce women to stay within abusive relationships can be perceived as a
form of structural spiritual abuse. We believe that the power dimension of
structural spiritual abuse perpetuated by some of the faith organisations and
communities can be as great, if not greater, than spiritual abuse perpetuated
by individuals. This is because they are representative of a religious entity,
and carry the weight of learned religious teachers, meaning their advice/rul-
ings on right conduct may be perceived by some as holy and sacred. Struc-
tural spiritual abuse is not always easy to identify due to its invisible coer-
cive nature. The intersection of individual and family honour and the fear of
being ostracised, makes speaking up particularly difficult. Hence, in relation
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to DVA, structural spiritual abuse could be enforced from four directions: reli-
gious institutions, community, family and the individual perpetrator.Where all
four employ interpretations of sacred texts which enable DVA—or at least, fail
to challenge DVA and its consequences for the victim and for faith practice—
the effect is cumulative, and the end result is that justice for the victim can be
denied.
Another similarity between the three groups was the notion of afterlife jus-
tice. All three monotheistic religions believe that human life continues after
death and the true justice would be fully granted in the life to come. Although
this gives hope and reassurance to victims of DVA, the concept could be mis-
used by the religious leaders in order to pressure women to stay in abusive
marriages which is again a form of structural spiritual abuse.
It must be recognised that all three monotheistic faiths are based on male
headship and a traditionalist patriarchal family model. In this context, women
are respected in their role in maintaining the faith and its values, the sanctity
of the family and the raising of children within the community. At the same
time, they are regarded as in some way inferior, excluded from the leadership
and in need of protection and control by a male member of the family (Levitt
&Ware 2006; Pyles 2007; Raday 2012). This dichotomy pervades any discussion
on justice for women of faith.
In conclusion, we can say that the concept of structural spiritual abuse
should be given more attention by the DVA literature and also by those who
are working with women of faith. Sometimes women of faith who have expe-
rienced violence may not be supported by their faith-based organisation and
may even be compelled to live in abusive relationships with justifications
derived from ‘black and white’ interpretations of the sacred texts. Structural
spiritual abuse implicitly violates the integrity and autonomyof womenof faith
through customary religious laws.There is a growingmovement amongwomen
of all faiths to challenge the interpretation of religious texts that justify DVA,
for example, the use of the concept of ijtihad by Muslim feminists to provide
solutions to new problems facing the modern era.We hope that this paper will
make some small contribution to the efforts of individuals and groups to reach
out across faiths to end this abuse.
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